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Standard economics is regarded as the theory of the market system. Profit
is the pivotal phenomenon of this system. Contrary to expectations, though,
profit is neither well defined not fully understood. The frailty of the theoretical
core is passed on to the subfields. This paper provides a consistent definition
of profit and applies it to the analysis of the effects of the government sector’s
budget on employment and the profitability of the business sector. Since the
formal point of departure is different from the standard approach it is quite
natural that we arrive at new conclusions in some fundamental issues.
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It is certainly not at all clear how a scientist can enjoy a “pacified
professional conscience” while basing his procedure on a marginal
utility curve drawn up on the assumption that “other people have much
the same psychology as himself”, for which proposition no conceivable
method of testing is given except “blind faith”. (Hutchison, 1960, p.
138), original emphasis
Critique of the standard economic research program relates to its theoretical, em-
pirical, methodological, and political aspects. Part of the pleas amounts to not
much more than ‘a bombardment of soap bubbles’ (Hahn, 1984, p. 78). If it is
acknowledged, however, that the serious scholars’ central objections are valid, and
if it is acknowledged on the other hand that the conclusions of standard economics
are formally correct, unsatisfactory results must – modus tollens − ultimately be
due to the basic assumptions.
Standard economics rests on a set of behavioral axioms (Arrow and Hahn, 1991,
p. v). This paper’s general thesis says that human behavior does not yield to the
axiomatic method (cf. Hudík, 2011; Rosenberg, 1980), yet the axiomatization of the
money economy’s fundamental structure is feasible. In the following, three general
non-behavioral axioms are put forward as formal foundation. The structural axiom
set is then directly applied to the special topic of taxation and government spending.
Since the formal point of departure is different from the standard approach it is quite
natural that we arrive at new conclusions in some fundamental issues.
The case for structural axiomatization has been made at length elsewhere (e.g.
2011e; 2011g). We therefore skip the discussion of methodological pros and cons
and proceed to practical application. The formal frame that constitutes the pure
consumption economy is set up in Section 1. In Section 2 profit as the pivotal
concept for the analysis of the money economy is derived from the axiom set. In
Sections 3 and 4 the income tax and a public good is introduced first in the pure
consumption economy with zero profits and then in an economy with positive profits
and profit distribution. Section 5 is devoted to the analysis of allocative changes that
are effected by taxation and government spending. The provisional assumption of a
fixed total labor input in then suspended. The determinants of employment are at
first established in Section 6.1 for an economy without government. The effects of
balanced and unbalanced government budgets on employment and profits are then
made explicit in Sections 6.2 and 6.3. It turns out that budget deficits are a crucial
precondition for growth and an economically successful private sector. Section 7
concludes.
1 Axioms
A sharply and clearly defined system of concepts enables sharp and
clear answers to be obtained from empirical investigation. (Hutchison,
1960, p. 35)
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The first three structural axioms relate to income, production, and expenditures in
a period of arbitrary length. For the remainder of this inquiry the period length is
conveniently assumed to be the calendar year. Simplicity demands that we have at
first one world economy, one firm, and one product.
Total income of the household sector Y in period t is the sum of wage income,
i.e. the product of wage rate W and working hours L, and distributed profit, i.e. the
product of dividend D and the number of shares N.
Y =WL+DN |t (1)
Output of the business sector O is the product of productivity R and working
hours.
O = RL |t (2)
The productivity R depends on the underlying production conditions. The 2nd
axiom should therefore not be misinterpreted as a linear production function.
Consumption expenditures C of the household sector is the product of price P
and quantity bought X .
C = PX |t (3)
The axioms represent the pure consumption economy, that is, no investment
expenditures, no foreign trade, and no taxes or any other government activity. It has
to be emphasized that all axiomatic variables are measurable in principle.
2 Profit and overall profit ratio
Profit is the pivotal concept for the analysis of the market system. The business
sector’s financial profit Q f i in period t is defined with (4) as the difference be-
tween the sales revenues – for the economy as a whole identical with consumption
expenditures C – and costs – here identical with wage income YW :1
Q f i ≡C−YW ≡ PX−WL ← YW ≡WL |t. (4)
For the business sector as a whole to make a profit consumption expenditures C
have in the simplest case to be greater than wage income YW . So that profit comes
into existence in the pure consumption economy the household sector must run a
deficit at least in one period.2 This in turn makes the inclusion of the financial sector
mandatory. An economic theory that does not include at least one bank that supports
1 Profits from changes in the value of financial and nonfinancial assets are excluded here to streamline
the analysis. For details see (2011f).
2 It needs hardly emphasis that in the investment economy the process of profit generation appears
more complex. For details see (2011h).
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the concomitant credit expansion cannot capture the essential features of the market
economy (for details see 2011e, Sec. 7-8).
From (4) and (1) follows for the relation of profit and distributed profit:
Q f i ≡C−Y +YD ← YD ≡ DN |t. (5)
Definitions are supplemented by connecting variables on the right-hand side of
the identity sign that have already been introduced by the axioms. To the definitions
in (4) and (5) three structural ratios are added now. With (6) the expenditure ratio
ρE , the sales ratio ρX , and the distributed profit ratio ρD is defined:
ρE ≡ CY ρX ≡
X
O
ρD ≡ DNWL ≡
YD
YW
|t. (6)
From (5), the first axiom (1), and the definitions (6) one gets for total profit that
it depends on the key ratios ρE and ρD and the absolute amount of total income:
Q f i ≡
(
ρE − 11+ρD
)
Y |t. (7)
To get rid of all absolute magnitudes the profit ratio ρQ is defined with (8) and
this gives a succinct summary of the structural interrelations of the profit ratio, the
expenditure ratio, and the distributed profit ratio for the business sector as a whole:
ρQ ≡ Q f iWL ⇒ ρQ ≡ ρE (1+ρD)−1 |t. (8)
The overall profit ratio ρQ is positive if the expenditure ratio ρE is > 1 or the
distributed profit ratio ρD is > 0, or both.3
3 Income tax in the zero profit economy
3.1 Initial conditions
The business sector consists of two firms and the given total labor input L is allocated
between them:
L≡ LA +LB |t. (9)
The 1st axiom (1) is differentiated and at the same time simplified by equalizing
the wage rates and by setting distributed profits to zero:
Y = WA︸︷︷︸
W
LA + WB︸︷︷︸
W
LB +DANA +DBNB︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
Y =WL |t.
(10)
3 The full implications of the profit definition are far-reaching; for details see (2011e, Sec. 12).
Mention should be made that neither neoclassicals nor Keynesians ever came to grips with profit
(Desai, 2008, p. 10), (Tómasson and Bezemer, 2010).
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Total income consists only of wage income. The household sector apportions
consumption expenditures between the two firms. The 3rd axiom (3) in combination
with (6) now reads:
C = PAXA +PBXB =CA +CB
C
Y
⇒ ρE = ρEA +ρEB |t.
(11)
From the 2nd axiom (2) follows under the condition of market clearing X = O
respectively ρX = 1:
PARALA = ρEAY if ρXA = 1, ρEA now independent
PBRBLB = ρEBY if ρXB = 1, ρEB now independent
|t. (12)
Accordingly, the market clearing prices of both firms are given by:
PA = ρEA
W
RA
L
LA
if ρXA = 1, ρEA indep.
PB = ρEB
W
RB
L
LB
if ρXB = 1, ρEB indep.
|t. (13)
The market clearing prices are determined by the respective expenditure ratios,
unit wage costs and the relative size of the firms measured in labor input.
From (4) and the condition of market clearing follows for financial profits:
Q f iA = LA(PARA−W )︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
if ρXA = 1
Q f iB = LB(PBRB−W )︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
if ρXB = 1
|t. (14)
Profits are zero if the respective values of the outputs per hour are equal to the
respective wage rates, which are in this simplified case equal for both firms.
From (12) in combination with the zero profit condition of (14) follows:
WLA = ρEAY
WLB = ρEBY
|t. (15)
In combination with (10) this yields the labor input of each firm:
LA = ρEAL
LB = ρEBL
|t. (16)
And this in turn gives for the relation of labor inputs:
LA
LB
=
ρEA
ρEB
ϖ ≡ ρEA
ρEB
|t. (17)
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Labor input is under the given conditions allocated in exact proportion to the
expenditure ratios. The proportion ϖ represents the consumer optimum.
Since we have from the standard theory of consumer demand the marginalistic
behavioral condition that the marginal rate of substitution MRS be equal to the
price ratio we are in the position to synthesize the structural formalism and the
marginalistic behavioral assumption. From the definition of the expenditure ratio
(6) follows:
ρEA
ρEB
=
CA
Y
CB
Y
=
PAXA
PBXB
|t. (18)
When, by applying the rule MRS = PAPB , the optimal quantities XA, XB are deter-
mined in the usual way as coordinates of the tangential point of budget constraint
and indifference map then the optimal partitioning of consumption expenditures
ρEA, ρEB is also determined. Any configuration of expenditure ratios can be formal-
ized as a consumer optimum.
The zero profit condition of (14) entails budget balancing for the household
sector as a whole:
CA−WLA = 0
CB−WLB = 0
C − Y = 0
(19)
Total consumption expenditures are equal to total income, i.e. the overall
expenditure ratio ρE in (11) is unity. In sum we then have for the initial situation:
equal wage rates in both firms, market clearing, zero profit, budget balancing, an
optimal partitioning of consumption expenditures, and the allocation of the given
labor input exactly in proportion to the households’ demand for the two products.
The business sector is structured according to the preferences of the households.
Since no agent has the possibility to improve her situation an overall economic
optimum is realized in period t. This initial configuration serves as clear-cut point
of reference.
3.2 Switch to government production and taxation
Now we substitute a government agency for firm B. Firm B’s output OB becomes OG
but it is qualitatively the same. If government would sell the product the partitioning
of consumption expenditures (11) would read:
C˘ = PAXA + P˘GXG |t. (20)
The former household purchases from firm B, however, are now virtual. The
former market price PB becomes the imputed price P˘G. The market transaction
volume and consumption expenditures decline:
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C = C˘− P˘GXG =CA |t. (21)
It is assumed at first that the same agents that formerly bought XB now absorb
XG. To achieve this restriction may prove difficult in the concrete case. If we take, as
an example, the replacement of private security services by a local police department
no great problems arise and we can shelve the question of how the distribution of
government output is organized beyond the market.
The former total income (10) now changes to:
Y =WLA +WLG−TY +YG︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
|t. (22)
The total amount of income tax payments is denoted TY . This amount is exactly
offset by government income YG. Thus total income remains unaltered and includes
private and public households. The household sector’s disposable income is given
by:
YH ≡ Y −YG ≡WLA +WLG−TY |t. (23)
Disposable income is lower than total income in the initial situation (10). As a
counterpart households’ consumption expenditures in (21) are lower, too.
The income tax payments TY are calculated by applying the income tax ratio ρT
to total wage income:
TY = ρT (WLA +WLG) if ρT indep. |t. (24)
The balanced budget condition demands that the income tax covers the wages
of the public sector:
TY =WLG |t. (25)
With the help of (9) this reduces to:
ρT =
LG
L
|t. (26)
The income tax ratio ρT is under the given conditions determined by the relative
size of the public sector measured in labor input. The ratio is, in a sense, the
equivalent to the imputed price P˘G for the former private and now public good. The
relative labor input is still determined by the optimal partitioning of consumption
expenditures. The relative size of the public sector is ultimately determined by the
households’ preferences for the output XG = XB.
For both the household and the business sector the situation does not change in
real terms. The same output is produced with the given labor input and absorbed
by the household sector. Although they are taxed, the wage income receivers’
real income remains unchanged. When the income tax ratio ρT is translated into
the imputed price P˘G the household sector’s distribution of imputed consumption
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expenditures is as optimal as before. Profits are zero before and after the substitution
of firm B by a government agency. The switch from private to public and from
buying to tax paying may be neutral in real terms, however, it seems improbable that
it is neutral in behavioral terms for myopic agents. It is a rare bird that is indifferent
between a seller and a tax collector. From the methodological point of view it is
worthwhile to note:
It is a characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon tradition in public finance that
the entire question was discussed solely in terms of taxation, totally
ignoring the expenditure side. (Blaug, 1998, p. 322)
In is important to recall that the household sector is at the moment not differentiated
and this implies that the redistribution among households that occurs when the sets
of taxpayers on the one hand and receivers of the output XB on the other differ is
not considered further at this juncture.
In the zero profit economy the relative size of public production can be analyti-
cally traced back to the optimal split-up of the household sector’s balanced budget
between different consumption goods. The partitioning of expenditures determines
the allocation of labor input. The relative size of the public sector in turn determines
the income tax ratio. In the zero profit economy the switching between private and
public production and vice versa is neutral in real terms. This changes when profits
are taken into the picture.
4 Positive profits
4.1 Initial conditions
Total income increases compared to (10) because both firms now distribute profits.
To simplify matters, the dividend D is set equal for both firms. Accordingly, the 1st
axiom (1) reads:
Y = WA︸︷︷︸
W
LA + WB︸︷︷︸
W
LB + DA︸︷︷︸
D
NA + DB︸︷︷︸
D
NB
Y =WL+DN
with L≡ LA +LB, N ≡ NA +NB |t.
(27)
Compared to (12) the expenditure ratios remain unchanged:
CA = ρEAY if ρEA indep.
CB = ρEBY if ρEB indep.
|t. (28)
By consequence, consumption expenditures for both products increase in pro-
portion to income.
Compared to (13) the new market clearing prices are higher:
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PA = ρEA
W
RA
L
LA︸ ︷︷ ︸
unaltered
+ρEA
DN
RALA
if ρXA = 1, ρEA indep.
PB = ρEB
W
RB
L
LB︸ ︷︷ ︸
unaltered
+ρEB
DN
RBLB
if ρXB = 1, ρEB indep.
|t. (29)
Under the condition of market clearing profit distribution raises the prices of
products A and B. Since labor input, costs and output remain unchanged profits
increase. The price increase effects a redistribution of output within the household
sector. The unchanged wage income translates at higher prices into a smaller part of
total output. The complementary part is absorbed by the receivers and spenders of
distributed profits (for details see 2011b, Sec. 9).
For the pure consumption economy as a whole profit is equal to distributed
profit:
Q f iA = ρEAY −WLA
Q f iB = ρEBY −WLB
Q f i = Y −WL
if ρEA +ρEB = 1 ρEA, ρEB indep.
Q f i = DN |t.
(30)
This configuration, which compares to that of Section 3.1, is reproducible for
an indefinite time. The interrelation of profit and distributed profit is self-sustaining
(for details see 2011a). This, of course, is a theoretical limiting case.
The profit ratio for each firm is, in formal analogy to the overall profit ratio (8),
given by:
ρQA ≡ ρEAYWLA −1
ρQB ≡ ρEBYWLB −1
|t. (31)
The partitioning of the consumption expenditures is the same as in as in the zero
profit case (17) :
ϖ ≡ ρEA
ρEB
|t. (32)
From the condition of profit ratio equalization then follows:
ρQA = ρQB ⇒ ϖ = LALB |t. (33)
Since the allocation of the labor input remains by assumption unchanged com-
pared to the zero profit case, the profit ratios in the two lines of production are
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equal by implication. The absolute profits of both firms are positive and of different
magnitude, yet the profit ratios are equal.
Taken as a whole, the household sector’s situation is unchanged in real terms
but the distribution of output within the household sector has changed compared to
the zero profit economy. The partitioning of expenditures and the allocation of labor
input is still optimal. This holds, of course, under the condition that the expenditure
ratios of both income groups remain unchanged. Changes of the partitioning of
expenditures are interesting in their own right and have to be kept apart. Compared
to the zero profit economy the business sector is better off with positive profits and
the wage income receivers are worse off in real terms. The receivers and spenders
of distributed profits are better off in real terms. This new configuration is now no
longer compared to the zero profit case but serves as a benchmark for the analysis
of the structural effects of the government’s budget.
4.2 Switch to government production and taxation
Again, we substitute government for firm B. Firm B’s output OB becomes OG. If
government would sell the product for the former price, i.e. P˘G = PB, the partitioning
of consumption expenditures (11) would remain unchanged:
C˘ = PAXA + P˘GXG |t. (34)
This, though, is not the case. The composition of total income (27), which
remains constant, changes to
Y =WLA +WLG +DN−TY +YG︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
(35)
and the household sector’s disposable income is given by:
YH ≡ Y −YG ≡WLA +WLG +DN−TY |t. (36)
The government’s budget is balanced by assumption, that is, income tax revenues
TY are equal to wage income WLG. With a unchanged expenditure ratio ρEA a lower
disposable income entails lower expenditures for product A:
CA = ρEAYH ρEA indep. |t. (37)
Under the condition that the allocation of labor input, and by consequence
the output of both firms, remains unaltered the market clearing price PA must fall.
Since wage costs WLA stay put firm A’s profit shrinks with declining consumption
expenditures:
Q f iA ≡CA−WLA |t. (38)
The output of the former firm B is not sold but distributed according to the
criteria of the government agency. The condition that profit and distributed profit are
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equal for the economy as a whole applies now to firm A alone since firm B has been
replaced by a government agency that makes no profit. Hence Q f iA = DN. Equation
(38) together with (37) and (36) then yields the result that profit and distributed
profit are zero under the given conditions. We are back at the zero profit economy
and this entails that the income tax ratio is given by (26).
The rule of profit ratio equalization applies now to the limiting case of zero
profits. The household sector taken as a whole again absorbs to whole output. The
allocation of labor input remains the same. Without profit distribution the wage
earners are better off compared to the benchmark of Section 4.1 because they can
buy the whole output with their unchanged income at a lower price. The former
share of the receivers of distributed profit vanishes. The switch from private to public
production disrupts the self-sustaining interaction between profit and distributed
profit. Although profit is not taxed at all it reduces to zero. In contradistinction to
the zero profit economy the switch from private to public production is not neutral
in real terms.
5 Reallocation of output and input
5.1 Neutral redistribution of output
Now we consider the case that government is no longer involved in producing a
public good but buys a certain fraction of the firms’ outputs. The initial situation is
derived from the 1st axiom and is the same as in Section 4.1, that is, total income is
given by:
Y = WA︸︷︷︸
W
LA + WB︸︷︷︸
W
LB + DA︸︷︷︸
D
NA + DB︸︷︷︸
D
NB |t. (39)
The income tax revenues are given by (24):
Y =WL+DN−ρT (WL+DN)+YG︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
|t.
(40)
The household sector’s disposable income is by consequence lower than total
income:
YH ≡ Y −YG |t. (41)
Consumption expenditures are again set in relation to disposable income and
therefore they decrease compared to (28) if the expenditure ratios remain unchanged:
CAH = ρEAYH ρEA indep.
CBH = ρEBYH ρEB indep.
|t. (42)
It is assumed that the reduced demand of the private sector is compensated for
by the public sector. The expenditure ratios of both sectors are at first identical.
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CAG = ρEAYG ρEA indep.
CBG = ρEBYG ρEB indep.
|t. (43)
By consequence, the consumption expenditures for product A are the same as in
(28) when private and public households are taken together:
CAH = ρEAYH
CAG = ρEAYG
CA = ρEAY
|t. (44)
Likewise for product B. Thus, the government in part replaces the households
with regard to consumption expenditures. Prices, labor inputs and product outputs re-
main unchanged. Relative prices by consequence stay put. The optimal partitioning
of consumption expenditures is maintained because government perfectly mimics
the preferences of the households. For the business sector only the customers’ faces
change. The declining demand of the household sector due to the reduction of
disposable income is fully compensated for by public demand for the output of the
two firms. Final output is redistributed without repercussions to production.
The household sector’s share of output diminishes in proportion to the lower
disposable income. Government distributes its share of output. Let us at first
divide the population into mutually exclusive sets: employees in the business and
government sector on the one hand, and a not further specified complementary set
on the other. Government staff consists of salaried civil staff that produces the civil
public goods and, for simplicity, of a non-salaried military staff that is supplied
with all necessities in kind. The remaining part of the population is referred to
the complementary set. Government then distributes its share of product A, e.g.
foodstuff, and product B, e.g. small arms weaponry, directly among its military
staff. In real terms the households trade a part of output against the public good
security. If this trade is regarded as satisfactory the wage income and distributed
profit income receivers are neither worse nor better off. The redistribution of output
does not violate the household sector’s preferences.
Alternatively, government may distribute product A, e.g. foodstuff, and product
B, now clothing, among the not further specified complementary set of the popu-
lation. In this case it is not as clear as in the foregoing in what the public good
consists of, or if there is any trade at all of output against a public good. This path
leads to transfers and we do not follow it further here.
The share of output of wage income and distributed profit income receivers
shrinks as they trade direct output for an indirect public good that does not violate
their preferences. Under ideal conditions taxation and the redistribution of output is
neutral with regard to the optimal partitioning of overall consumption expenditures
and the allocation of labor input.
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5.2 Changing the structure of demand and production
Government, though, may as well change the initial spending pattern. It is assumed
now that government does not buy product A but spends all tax revenues on product
B. Therefore households’ consumption expenditures CAH are reduced as before but
the reduction is not made good by government spending. Likewise consumption
expenditures CBH adapt in proportion to lower disposable income but this decline is
overcompensated by government spending CBG.
Compared to (42) households’ spending pattern remains unchanged.
CAH = ρEAYH ρEA indep.
CBH = ρEBYH ρEB indep.
|t. (45)
Compared to (43) government’s new spending pattern is given by:
CAG = 0
CBG = ρEAYG +ρEBYG ρEA,ρEB indep.
|t. (46)
Total consumption expenditures are equal to total income:
CA ≡CAH +CAG = ρ◦EAY ρ◦EA indep.
CB ≡CBH +CBG = ρ◦EBY ρ◦EB indep.
C = Y |t.
(47)
While the overall expenditure ratio ρE is still unity the expenditure ratios for
the two lines of production change: ρ◦EA is smaller than ρEA in (44), ρ◦EB is larger
than ρEB.
Labor input is adapted to the new structure of consumption expenditures to the
effect that:
LA
LB
=
ρ◦EA
ρ◦EB
(48)
This entails that labor input migrates from firm A to firm B without any change
in wage rates. Hence total income is not affected by the reallocation. Prices, PA
and PB respectively, remain constant because the changes of labor inputs LA and
LB in (29) are proportional to the changes of the expenditure ratios according to
(48). Absolute profit falls in firm A with decreasing output and labor input, and
increases in firm B with increasing output and labor input. The profit ratios, however,
are again equal. This follows from conditions (32) and (33). If the firms are free
of size-illusion and geared exclusively to the profit ratio nothing changes. The
reallocation of labor inputs is neutral for the business sector. If, on the other hand,
the firms take the absolute amounts of profits into account firm A is worse off and
firm B is better off. A rational firm, though, is not allowed to see it in this mode.
Only the profit ratio counts. The household sector, too, is not affected in real terms
by the new composition of final output and the reallocation of labor input. The
receivers of wage income and distributed profit income trade a part of output against
a public good. Whether less of product A and more of B is consumed in the making
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of the public good or vice versa is a question analogous to the factor combination in
production. Under the additional condition that government has realized an optimal
combination the household sector is not affected by the changed spending pattern
of government.
6 Budget effects
Up to this point total labor input L has been taken as constant. We were chiefly
concerned with the optimal partitioning of consumption expenditures and the cor-
responding allocation of labor input among firms and government in the pure
consumption economy. In the following the differentiation between firms is sus-
pended. The business sector produces one consumption good. We are now at first
interested in the determination of the volume of employment and how it is affected
by the government’s budget. Subsequently we turn to profits.
6.1 Initial conditions
The structural employment equation follows from the axioms (1) to (3) and the
definitions (6) as:
L =
YD
PR
ρX
ρE
−W
|t. (49)
In this form the axioms now imply the additional assumption that employment
as dependent variable is determined by the rest of the system. This is an assumption
about the direction of dependency in a system with complex and mutual interrela-
tions and this add-on assumption is no constituent of the axiom set which is clearly
open to various dependency interpretations. Dependency is conceptually different
from causality.
The employment equation states − with the other variables unaltered in each
case (for details see 2012, Sec. 6):
(i) An increase of the wage rate leads to higher employment, i.e. to a
lower unemployment rate.
(ii) A price increase is conductive to lower employment.
(iii) Provided that wage rate, price and distributed profit all change with the
same rate there is no effect on employment.
(iv) If the configuration of price and wage rate changes is such that the
denominator remains unchanged then employment stays where it is, no
matter how large wage rate and price changes are. In this case perfect
wage–price flexibility has no impact on employment.
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(v) An increase of the expenditure ratio ρE leads to higher employment.
An expenditure ratio ρE > 1 presupposes the existence of at least one
bank.
(vi) A productivity increase leads to lower employment.
(vii) As the difference in the denominator approaches zero employment
goes (formally) off to infinity. This singularity is an implicit prop-
erty of the economy as given by the structural axiom set. When this
point of discontinuity is approached the system’s behavior changes in
unpredictable ways.
(viii) Profit distribution exerts a positive influence on employment.
Statements (i) to (viii) follow without regress to any behavioral assumptions from
the axiom set and the ‘laws of algebra’ (Shaik, 1980, p. 83). If the axioms capture
reality the logical implications of (49) are observable (for details see 2011i).
With regard to the process of adaptation of employment to changes of the
independent variables the employment equation (49) implies that the independent
variables have to be fixed at the beginning of the period under consideration. Since
the period length is arbitrary no great distortions arise from this idealization if the
length is conveniently chosen (for details see 2011c).
The standard key variable for the establishment of full employment is the real
wage WP which has to fall. There seems to be a rare unanimity among economists
of all shades on this point (Prychitko, 1998, p. 2). In marked contrast, the struc-
tural axiomatic approach asserts that in the consumption economy employment is
determined by the expenditure ratio ρE and the factor cost ratio ρF of which the real
wage is a constituent. This follows from (49) under the conditions that the product
market is cleared, i.e. ρX = 1, and that the relation of dividend to wage rate ρV is
held constant. After the supplementation of the two definitions
ρF ≡ WPR ρV ≡
D
W
(50)
the employment equation reduces to its simplest form:
L =
DN
PR
ρX
ρE
− W
PR
=
ρV N
ρX
ρE ρF
−1
=
ρV N
1
ρE ρF
−1
if ρX = 1 |t. (51)
Employment depends in the pure consumption economy on ρE , i.e. the structural
axiomatic expression of Keynes’s effective demand (Keynes, 1973, pp. 23-24), and
the outcome of the market price formation ρF .
Under the conditions that the product market is cleared, i.e. ρX = 1, and the
household sector’s budget is balanced, i.e. ρE = 1, a higher factor cost ratio ρF
means higher employment as shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Structural relationship between factor cost ratio and employment (ρE = 1)
If, vice versa, the factor cost ratio is fixed, then the curve has a similar shape for
an increasing expenditure ratio ρE . The two variables of (51) are interchangeable
with regard to their effect on employment. The curve goes off to infinity and this
entails that there is no such thing as a natural rate of unemployment or some kind of
unemployment equilibrium.4 Any level of employment can be realized in principle,
that is, when the fullness of microeconomic mismatches and frictions is excluded
for the moment.
In sum, full employment can be achieved in the pure consumption economy
by any suitable combination of the expenditure ratio and the factor cost ratio. Full
employment is possible in principle but there exist no ‘forces’ that swiftly bring
about the right combination of ρX , ρE and ρF . The structural axiomatic approach is
methodologically free of equilibrium-occultism.
6.2 Budget effects on employment
The government’s role is restricted to the purchase of the business sector’s undiffer-
entiated output. There is no separate salaried government employment.
From the 1st axiom disposable income has already been derived as:
YH =WL+DN−TY |t. (52)
Total consumption expenditures (3) are now given by:
C ≡CH +CG |t. (53)
4 “It is not news that NAIRU theory is a failure.” (Hall, 2011, p. 446)
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Government expenditures are autonomous, households’ expenditures are for-
mally brought in relation to disposable income via the expenditure ratio ρEH:
C = ρEHYH +CG ρEH indep. |t. (54)
Solving (52) to (54) for L and inserting (50) one arrives at
L =
ρV N +
budget effect︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
W
(
CG
ρEH
−TY
)
1
ρEHρF
−1
if ρX = 1 |t (55)
which compares to (51). In order to bring the budget effect sharper into focus,
the budget expenditure ratio is introduced in analogy to the household sector’s
expenditure ratio:
ρEG ≡ CGTY |t. (56)
A budget expenditure ratio ρEG > 1 indicates that government spending exceeds
income tax revenues, in other words, it indicates a budget deficit. The alternative
version of (55) then reads:
L =
ρV N +
budget effect︷ ︸︸ ︷
CG
W
(
1
ρEH
− 1
ρEG
)
1
ρEHρF
−1
if ρX = 1 ρEH, ρEG indep. |t.
(57)
The first thing to note is that the government’s budget is of no consequence for
employment if both the household sector’s and the government sector’s expenditure
ratios are unity. If ρEH = 1 and ρEG = 1 the budget effect is zero and then we are
back at the initial employment equation (51). This holds also if the expenditure
ratios are different from unity but numerically equal. The government sector makes
a difference for employment only if its expenditure ratio is different from that of the
household sector. Taken in isolation, a balanced government budget is not neutral.
If the household sector’s expenditure ratio is different from unity, i.e. ρEH 6= 1,
and the government’s budget is balanced, i.e. CG = TY respectively ρEG = 1, then the
budget effect depends on the budget’s volume which is expressed by the autonomous
expenditures CG:
balanced budget effect =
CG
W
(
1
ρEH
−1
)
|t. (58)
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If the household sector’s expenditure ratio is greater than unity then employment
expands but the balanced budget effect on employment is negative. Parts of income
are taken away from households, which spend in the current period in excess of their
income, and are transferred to government with an expenditure ratio of unity. In
this case a balanced budget dampens an employment expansion. Vice versa, if the
household sector’s expenditure ratio is below unity. In this case a balanced budget
softens a employment contraction.
Figure 2 shows that if ρEH > 1 there is a dampening effect on the right hand
side of the intersection of the initial curve (51) and (57). On the left hand side
of the intersection the balanced budget employment curve lies above the initial
employment curve. Thus, the balanced budget dampens both the employment
expansion or contraction that is brought about by the household sector’s varying
expenditure ratio. The magnitude of the dampening effect in both directions depends
on the budget’s volume. With a small volume the curves in Figure 2 almost coincide
and the employment effects of the government’s budget are negligible. The balanced
budget operates as a built-in stabilizer that tends to keep employment close to
the actual level. That is, it stabilizes full employment as well as unemployment.
Expression (58) in combination with (57) is a generalization of the Haavelmo-
Theorem.
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Figure 2: Balanced budget effect (ρF = 0.8)
It is well worth remarking that all budget effects may be counteracted by a
simultaneous change of the factor cost ratio. The positive balanced budget effect
on the left hand side of ρEH=1 in Figure 2 for example may be annihilated by a
price increase that lowers the numerical value of the factor cost ratio ρF in (57).
A productivity increase works in the same manner (for details see 2011d). All
this is quite obvious and the diverse employment effects have been enumerated in
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Section 6.1. Supporting or counteracting variations of the other variables of (57) on
employment are therefore not explicitly mentioned in the following.
If the household sector’s expenditure ratio is unity, i.e. ρEH = 1, a budget deficit,
i.e. ρEB > 1, boosts employment according to:
deficit/surplus effect (i) =
1
W
(CG−TY ) |t. (59)
This effect is commonsensical.
Hitherto both sides of the government’s budget have been assumed to be au-
tonomous. Next, the income tax revenues TY are coupled to income via the income
tax ratio ρT :
TY = ρT (WL+DN) = ρTW (L+ρV N) = ρTWL(1+ρD)
ρT indep. |t.
(60)
The budget effect in (55) then takes a new form:
deficit/surplus effect (ii) =
CG
WρEH
−ρT (L+ρV N) |t. (61)
When we start with an income tax ratio ρT that reduces the difference in (61) to
zero then a subsequent increase of the tax ratio has a negative effect on employment.
This, too, is commonsensical.
With (61) employment appears also on the right hand side of the employment
equation (55). After solving for L it reads:
L =
ρV N
budget effect︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1−ρT ) +
budget effect︷ ︸︸ ︷
CG
WρEH
1
ρEHρF
−1+ ρT︸︷︷︸
budget effect
if ρX = 1 |t. (62)
The budget effect is no longer as plain as in (57). Equation (62) states, roughly
speaking, that an isolated increase of the income tax ratio ρT reduces employment
and that an isolated increase of autonomous government expenditures CG boosts
employment.
The household sector’s expenditure ratio has been assumed to be equal for both
the receivers of wage income and of distributed profit income. And the income tax
ratio has been taken to be equal for both income categories. In the general case they
need not be equal. The inclusion of these additional details makes the employment
equation quite naturally more intricate. Here we are content with the structural
axiomatic formalization of the basic effects.
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6.3 Budget effects on profits
From the business sector’s perspective the profit effects of the government’s budget
are clearly more important than the employment effects.
Profit has been defined with (4):
Q f i ≡C−WL = (PR−W )L if ρX = 1 |t. (63)
Together with (55) this yields for the simplest case, i.e. ρEH = 1:
Q f i = DN +(CG−TY ) |t. (64)
Total profit of the business sector is equal to distributed profit if the budget
is balanced. In this limiting case there is no difference to the pure consumption
economy without government as given by (5). Total profit increases with a budget
deficit and diminishes with a budget surplus. With steadily growing deficits in the
mature economies (for an example see Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1998, p. 283,
Fig. 16-1) the government sector has become a major source of profits from the
1970s onwards. The business sector therefore cannot have a genuine interest in
budget balancing, not to speak of a reduction of public debt (for details see 2011a).
The crucial question in this context is whether the business sector is viable at all
without the deficit spending of the public sector. This depends also on the relation of
investment and household sector saving (for details see 2011h) and on the relation
of exports to imports. If both relations are unfavorable the government’s deficit may
become the sole source of profits. Equation (64) has some obvious consequences
for the laissez-faire doctrine.
In the pure consumption economy with a household expenditure ratio different
from unity one has as the general case:
Q f i ≡
(
DN +
CG
ρEH
−TY
)
Φ
with Φ≡ ρEH−11
ρEHρF
−1
+ρEH |t.
(65)
The expression Φ brings about a profit increase if the household sector’s ex-
penditure ratio is greater that unity, i.e. ρEH > 1, and vice versa, if it is below
unity. This effect is somewhat counteracted by the budget effect that is given by the
fraction of autonomous government expenditures CG and the ratio ρEH.
The business sector’s overall profit ratio is finally given by:
ρQ ≡ ρEH (1+ρD)+
budget effect︷ ︸︸ ︷
CG
WL
(
1− ρEH
ρEG
)
−1 |t. (66)
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If both the household sector’s and the business sector’s expenditure ratios are
symmetrical we are back to (8) and there is no budget effect on the overall profit
ratio. Given ρEH = 1, the budget effect on profitability is positive if ρEG > 1 and
negative if ρEG < 1, with the magnitude of the effect depending on the magnitude
of autonomous government spending. Higher employment and a higher wage rate
lessen the budget effect on the overall profit ratio. It is worth emphasizing that profit
is not taxed at all. According to (60) only wages and distributed profits are taxed.
7 Conclusions
Behavioral assumptions, rational or otherwise, are not solid enough to be eligible
as first principles of theoretical economics. Hence all endeavors to lay the formal
foundation on a new site and at a deeper level actually need no further vindication.
The present paper suggests three non-behavioral axioms as groundwork for the
formal analysis of the effects of taxation and government spending.
The main results of the structural axiomatic inquiry are:
• In the pure consumption economy the overall profit ratio is positive if the
expenditure ratio is > 1 or the distributed profit ratio is > 0, or both.
• In the zero profit economy the relative size of public production can be
analytically traced back to the optimal split-up of the household sector’s
balanced budget between different consumption goods. The partitioning of
expenditures determines the allocation of labor input. The relative size of
the public sector in turn determines the income tax ratio. In the zero profit
economy the switching between private and public production and vice versa
is neutral in real terms.
• In an economy with positive profits and full profit distribution the switch from
private to public production disrupts the self-sustaining interaction between
profit and distributed profit. Although profit is not taxed at all it reduces to
zero. In contradistinction to the zero profit economy the switch from private
to public production is not neutral in real terms.
• The balanced budget operates as a built-in stabilizer that tends to keep em-
ployment at the actual level. That is, it stabilizes full employment as well as
unemployment. The structural axiomatic approach provides a generalization
of the Haavelmo-Theorem.
• Total profit of the business sector is equal to distributed profit if the private
and public budget is balanced. In this limiting case there is no difference to
the pure consumption economy without government. Total profit increases
with a budget deficit and diminishes with a budget surplus. With steadily
growing deficits in the mature economies the government sector has become
a major source of profits.
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